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Abstract
Recently, several ownership protection schemes which combine encryption and secret sharing technology have been
proposed. To reveal the original message, however, they exploited XOR operation which is similar to a one-time pad.
It is fairly losing the reconstruction simplicity due to the human visual system (HVS). It should be noted that it is
completely different from the original concept of visual cryptography proposed by Naor and Shamir. To decrypt the
secret message, Naor and Shamir’s concept stacked k transparencies together. The operation solely does a visual OR
of the shares rather than XOR, the way HVS does. In this paper, we, consequently, adopt Naor and Shamir’s concept to
apply correct theory of visual cryptography. Furthermore, audio copyright protection schemes which exploit chaotic
modulation or watermark integration into frequency components have been widely proposed. Nevertheless, security
issue against intentional distortions has not been addressed yet. In this paper, we aim to construct a resilient audio
ownership protection scheme to enhance the security by integrating the discrete wavelet transform and discrete
cosine transform, visual cryptography, and digital timestamps. In the proposed scheme, the watermark does not
require to be embedded within the original audio but is used to generate a secret image and a public image. The
watermark is then acquired by performing OR between the secret and public image. We can alleviate the trade-off
expenses between the capacity of data payload and two other important properties such as imperceptibility and
robustness without modifying the original audio signals. The experiments against a variety of audio signals processing
provided by StirMark confirm superior robustness of the proposed scheme. We also demonstrate the intentional
distortion by modifying the original content via experiments, it reveals comparable reliability. The proposed scheme
can be widely applied to the area of audio ownership protection.
Keywords: Digital watermarking; Audio ownership protection; Visual cryptography; Transform domain; Timestamp
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Protection of an intellectual property has become a major
problem in the digital age. It is possible to duplicate digital
information a million-fold and distribute it over the entire
world in seconds through the Internet. There are various
techniques for preventing and/or minimizing the risk of
copying, making copying easier to detect, and assisting in
proving infringement. One of the technical measures is to
embed a ‘digital watermark’ in the host data. The water-
mark is regarded as a code, which is impossible or very
difficult to detect and/or remove, and it can be used to
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identify the source of the copied data [1]. This aids users
in proving copyright infringement.
Among the development of digital watermarkings in
a various multimedia, digital audio watermarking pro-
vides a special challenge because the human auditory
system (HAS) is extremely more sensitive than a human
visual system (HVS) [2]. Most audio watermark algo-
rithms insert the information as a plain-bit or adjusted
digital signal using a key-based embedding algorithm. The
embedded information is hidden and linked inseparably
with the source data structure. For the optimal water-
marking application trade-offs among competing criteria
such as robustness, non-perceptibility, capacity, non-
detectability, and security have to be considered.However,
there is always trade-off between capacity and other two
important properties, non-perceptibility and robustness.
A higher capacity is always obtained at the expense of
© 2014 Ciptasari et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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either robustness or non-perceptibility (or both) [3]. Fur-
ther, some audio quality degradations inevitably occur due
to the embedding process.
1.2 Relatedwork
In order to eliminate the trade-offs among competing
criteria aforementioned, several audio ownership protec-
tion schemes [4-6], which are different from the tradi-
tional watermarking, have been proposed. These schemes
are referred to as zero-watermarking. In the paper [4],
three-level discrete wavelet decomposition (DWT) is
applied to get the low-frequency subband of the host
audio, which is the perceptually significant region of
it. To make the scheme resist lossy compression oper-
ation such as MP3 compression, discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT) is performed on the obtained low-frequency
wavelet coefficients. And by considering the Gaussian sig-
nal suppression property of higher-order cumulant, the
fourth-order cumulants of the obtained DWT-DCT coef-
ficients are calculated to ensure the robustness of the
scheme against various noise addition operations. Finally,
the essential features extracted based on DWT, DCT, and
higher-order cumulant are used for generating binary pat-
tern. In addition, the scheme introduced the presence
of the authentication center to keep the copyright infor-
mation such as the secret keys, original host audio, and
the corresponding digital timestamp used in copyright
demonstration.
Wang and Hu [5] proposed the scheme created by
selecting some maximum absolute value of low frequency
wavelet coefficients of original audio. The construction of
the watermark is random by chaotic sequence. After gen-
erating the watermark, chaotic inverse search is adopted
to get the initial value of another watermark sequence
that is identical to the original one. In verification phase,
instead of using an original audio, they exploited chaotic
modulation to generate the original watermark sequence.
In order to reduce the processing time, they cut the water-
mark into fifty sections. According to our experiment,
despite long hours of executing the initial value searching
process, we could not achieve the convergence condition.
The initialization of its initial value is a somewhat trial-
and-error process. The time complexity of each section
is O(NM) where N indicates the watermark’s size, and M
refers to the number of iterations. In this case, we can-
not predict the M value. We, therefore, argue that their
algorithm is not efficient. Moreover, their scheme indeed
requires the length of its original watermark sequence to
generate original watermark W in extraction stage. This
value was not kept either in secret key K or initial vector
H. In other words, their scheme cannot be regarded as a
blind watermarking.
The authors also proposed a modification of Chen and
Zhu’s scheme for generating secret keys in their earlier
work [6]. Compared to that of Chen and Zhu’s, the key’s
size is relatively the same as its watermark. The scheme,
however, is claimed to have good degree of robustness,
imperceptibility, and payload capacity.
Furthermore, some ownership protection schemes
which combine encryption and secret sharing technology
[7-12] have also been proposed, and they achieved good
results. Several works in visual cryptography [7,9,11] were
performed in a distinctive way. In order to retrieve the
secret image, they exploit XOR operation among shares
instead of stacking them. This mechanism is considered
as an appropriate way to be employed in ownership pro-
tection area. Lou et al. [11] proposed the scheme that
extracts the feature from the protected image by uti-
lizing the secret key and the relation between the low
and middle sub-band wavelet coefficients. Then, the fea-
ture and watermark are used to generate a secret image
by the codebook of visual cryptography technique. To
provide further protection, the secret image, with the
exception of the secret key and codebook, is registered
to certification authority (CA). In the verification proce-
dure, public image is first generated from the suspected
image. The extracted watermark is obtained by perform-
ing XOR operation between secret and public image.
However, such an impressive combination has not yet
been proposed for audio.
Lee and Chen [10] introduced cryptographic tools into
the watermarking process to provide security against
malicious attacks. As a first step, a gray-level origi-
nal image was decomposed by exploiting wavelet trans-
form. Vector quantization was then exploited to generate
indices set I that would be signed by the owner with
digital signature technique. Lastly, the owner sent signed
indices set S to a trusted CA. CA digitally added time
and date when it received them. This scheme can protect
the indices set from alteration, and everyone can use it to
verify the copyright logo corresponding to the test image.
Chen and Horng [12] improved their earlier work [10].
In order to resist against geometric distortions, the water-
mark was first permutated based on two-dimension pseu-
dorandom permutation generated by seed s. Then, the
polarity table T was constructed to be used in comput-
ing the verification key K. They included digital signature
and timestamp to avoid either counterfeit or copy attacks
and to make public verification possible. The advantage
of their scheme was that it is resistant to blind pattern
matching attack.
1.3 Challenge issues
Based on related work, we summarize the following chal-
lenge issues:
1. Consider the watermarking scheme proposed by
Chen and Zhu [4]. The embedding process takes host
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audio A and watermark w as input and generates
three secret keys. These keys imply the information
of selected frames, extracted feature points, and its
watermark, where respectively this information is
denoted by K1, K2, and K3. Consider the case when
an adversary intends to produce a watermarked file
using the same procedure in the paper [4]. The
adversary simply extracts the information of selected
frames and then applies exclusive-or operation for
adversary’s watermark like binary image to obtain the
K3. In an extreme case, it is sufficient for the
adversary to modify K3. Thus, K3 contains the
information of watermark. As a result, an adversary
can easily produce the information K1, K2, and K3
from an audio file and can claim that the file contains
his/her watermark. This situation shows that Chen
and Zhu’s scheme suffers from security weakness.
Referring to the concept which is described in [3,13],
the security of watermark algorithms depends on the
secret keys used for embedding and recovery process.
In contrast to this concept, Chen and Zhu’s secret
keys are somewhat public knowledge rather than
confidential information. The first challenge issue is
on how to improve the scheme in order to fulfill an
appropriate watermarking concept.
2. As previously mentioned, some image ownership
protection schemes [7-12], which combine
encryption and secret sharing technology have also
been proposed. Regarding original visual
cryptography (VC) proposed by Naor and Shamir
[14], the ciphertext is supposed to be revealed
directly by a HVS. In that case, HVS does a visual OR
rather than XOR operation. Unfortunately, most
aforementioned existing schemes exploited XOR
operation. Hence, the second challenge issue is on
how to employ VC correctly in a digital
watermarking area.
3. In terms of audio intellectual property protection,
both Chen and Zhu [4] and Wang and Hu [5] do not
provide any experimental results dealing with
security aspects of their scheme against intentional
distortions. Although Chen and Zhu [4] registers
their secret keys, host original image, and timestamp
to CA for copyright demonstration, it reflects that
the timestamp is not digitally added by CA. They do
not provide a detailed explanation on this issue as
well. We argue whether this situation leads to
owner’s deception. Furthermore, most watermarking
algorithms cannot resist against malicious
manipulations of the content. Such manipulations
may distort audio data as well as readily destroy or
even remove the watermark. The last challenge issue
is on how to enhance security against intentional
distortions.
1.4 Contribution
This paper proposes a novel audio watermarking based
on visual cryptography that can be exploited in owner-
ship protection area. Akin to our previous work [6], we
extract the feature by performing H-level wavelet decom-
position to obtain low-frequency subband of segmented
host audio. To make the proposed scheme resistant to
lossy compression operation, discrete cosine transform is
performed to the obtained low-frequencywavelet coefficients.
We use the whole DWT-DCT coefficients rather than a
certain part of coefficients to adjust matrix dimension.
In the proposed scheme, the watermark does not
require to be embedded into the original audio but is
used to generate secret and public share images by using
the visual cryptography technique. In a nutshell, fea-
ture extraction is first accomplished to obtain digital
audio’s features by frequency-domain functions. The shar-
ing matrices referred to as codebook are then generated in
such ways that have two properties: contrast and secrecy.
Instead of data embedding, audio’s features and binary-
valued watermark are integrated to construct secret
shares based on generated codebook. In other words, the
image shares contain watermark information. In contrast
to existing schemes [7-12] that exploit XOR operation, we
employ a visual OR of the shares to reveal the original
watermark as its original concept stated in [14].
Further, product registration to a trusted authority is
a well-established way of protecting intellectual property
rights as well as offering indisputable proof of original
ownership and legal rights [15]. In order to prevent any
intentional distortion, digital timestamping is incorpo-
rated in a proposed scheme. Referring to timestamping’s
mechanism [16], we simplify the protocol by using CA as
a trusted party which is responsible for the issuing and
verification of timestamps as well as issuing a digital cer-
tificate that contains a name of the holder, a serial number,
expiration date, and a holder’s public key. Therefore, the
steps of generating a timestamp are as follows. At first,
the owner signs his protected data using his private key
and generates a fingerprint by using a digital signature
function. Then, the fingerprint is sent to CA. The CA gen-
erates a timestamp based on the owner’s fingerprint and
the date and time obtained from an accurate time source.
The timestamp is sent back to the owner. The CA keeps a
record of the timestamp for future verification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the development of an ownership protection
scheme. In Section 3, the proposed scheme is investigated
against incidental and intentional distortions. Finally, the
conclusion is provided in Section 4.
2 Proposed scheme
The proposed scheme comprises two stages: share image
generation stage and watermark verification stage. Host
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audio is first segmented into several frames, and each
frame contains N samples. Next, the sample features are
extracted by performing wavelet decomposition to obtain
the low-frequency coefficients. Then, DCT is exploited
only to the obtained low-frequency wavelet coefficients.
Afterward, features of DCT coefficients are calculated.
Finally, encoding utilizes these features and binary-valued
watermark to generate secret share images according to
the concept of Naor and Shamir’s scheme [14]. One of the
secret share image is then registered to CA for further
protection and will be used for watermark verification
purpose.
To retrieve the watermark, the received audio is seg-
mented into several frames that contain N samples each.
Then, the samples’ features are extracted by perform-
ing wavelet decomposition to obtain the low-frequency
coefficients. Next, DCT is exploited to the obtained low-
frequency wavelet coefficients, and the DCT coefficients
are calculated. The decoding exploits these features and
registered share image to generate a public share image.
The watermark is recovered by performing OR operation
between secret and public share images and then used to
verify the ownership. The following subsections provide
more detailed description on each stage.
2.1 Main process in the proposed scheme
2.1.1 Feature extraction
To accomplish feature extraction, the host audio is first
segmented into several frames in which each frame con-
tainsN samples andT-level wavelet decomposition is per-
formed on each frame. Then, approximated coefficients
in the LLT subband are transformed to DCT coefficients.
Let ATC = DCT(AT ) = {aTC(n)|n = 1, . . . , N2T } be
the obtained DCT coefficients. The output array of DCT
coefficients contains real numbers, and they have a range




1 -1 ≤ aHC(n) ≤ 0
2 0 < aHC(n) ≤ 1. (1)
2.1.2 Encoding and decoding
In principle, encoding is the process of generating secret
shares by integrating binary value of the watermark and
digital audio’s features, while decoding refers to process
of revealing the original watermark message by stacking
those secret shares.
Formally, the basic model of visual secret sharing is
denoted as k out of n problem. Given a secret message, we
would like to generate n transparencies so that the origi-
nal message is visible if any k of them are stacked together;
otherwise, themessage is totally invisible.We exploit orig-
inal encryption problem proposed by Naor and Shamir
[14], that is a 2 out of 2 or (2,2)-secret sharing prob-
lem. The watermark is visible if two shares are stacked
together; otherwise, it does not provide any information.
In this paper, the watermark consists of a collection of
black and white pixels. Each original pixel appears in n
shares, one for each transparency. Each share consists of
m black and white sub-pixels. The resulting sharingmatri-
ces can be represented as two collections of n×m Boolean
matrices S={S0, S1}. To share either a white or black pixel,
one randomly chooses one of the matrices in either S0
or S1, respectively. When transparencies i1, i2, . . . , ik are
stacked together, the black subpixels appearing on a com-
bined share are represented by OR operation of rows
i1, i2, . . . , ik in sharing matrices S. The gray level of this
combined share is proportional to the Hamming weight
H(V) where V is the m-vector of the resulting OR opera-
tion [14].
The sharing matrices should satisfy two properties,
namely contrast and secrecy.
1. In case of contrast, the gray level G is deemed valid if
the following condition is satisfied.
G =
{
black if H(V) ≥ d
white otherwise (2)
for a threshold 1 ≤ d ≤ m. In order to comply with a
condition (2), the codebook shown in (3) and (4) is
arranged in such a way that H(V) is 2 or 3 in S0, while
it is 4 in S1.
2. In terms of secrecy, the number of 1’s in S
should have same probability distribution, i.e.,
codebook shown in (3) and (4) has probability
Prob(Si =′ 1′/0) = Prob(Si =′ 1′/1) = 0.5. Let
S = [sij] be a Boolean matrix with a row for each
share and a column for each subpixels. For each
pixel, the share matrix must be chosen at random
and must be known only by the sender (owner) and
receiver (CA), while the codebook is publicly known.
The examples of share matrix representations used in
our proposed scheme are described as follows.
S0 =
{(
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
)(
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
)(
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
)(
0 1 1 0





0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
)(
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)(
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
)(
1 0 1 0




Since it is accomplished by applying four subpixels per
pixel, it affects the aspect ratio of original image. In order
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to compute bit error rate (BER), it is required to have
extracted watermark in the same size as its original. Let
W (M × N) be the original watermark image. Note that
the extracted watermark W ′ will be equal to M × 4N .
In order to yield the same watermark size as its original
one, it is necessary to accomplish the reduction process of
extracted watermark. Assume that black pixel is assigned
as 1 and white pixel value is 0, the reduction process is
performed based on the following conditions:
Reduction result =
{
1 if the number of black pixel > 3
0 otherwise.
(5)
2.2 Share image generation and verification procedure
2.2.1 Share image generation procedure
Figure 1 illustrates the secret share image generation, and
the procedure is described as follows.
Input: host original audio A = {a(i)|i = 1, . . . , Lsample},
binary image watermark W (N× N) ={w(i,j)|w(i,j){0,1}},
and codebook C.
Output: secret share images SA(N × mN) and SB(N ×
mN) wherem is the number of subpixels per pixel.
Step 1. Firstly, A is segmented into F frames, denoted
as Fr = { fri|i = 1, . . . , F}, and each frame contains
N samples. Next, T-level wavelet decomposition is per-
formed on each frame fri to yield its coarse signal AT and
detail signalDT , DT−1, . . . ,D1. Then, to take advantage of
low-frequency coefficient, which is robust against signal
processing manipulations, DCT is only performed on AT
and obtained DCT coefficients are denoted as
ATCk = DCT(ATk ) =
{





Step 2. Construct a new sequence BTCn = {bTCn (n)|n =
1, . . . ,N/2T } by taking the first n frames of ATCk .
Step 3. Let x be 1.
a. Obtain the feature type t from BTCn based on
Equation (1).
b. Construct a secret share block S(x) by utilizing a
codebook C as described in (3) and (4), feature type t,
and a corresponding watermark pixel value w(i,j ).
c. Add x to one. If x ≤ N× N then go to a.
Step 4.The secret share images SA(N×mN) and SB(N×
mN) are generated. Note that the security of our scheme
is based on the SA(N × mN).
Step 5. The next step is timestamping for the protected
data. The owner signs the security parameter by using
digital signature scheme:
f = DSOPK (SA,C) (7)
where DSOPK () is a digital signature function by using
the owner’s private keyOPK, and f stands for owner’s fin-
gerprint. Afterward, owner sends f, S, and C to the CA.
CA creates a timestamp TS with the owner’s fingerprint f,
and the time t and date d obtained from an accurate time
source as
TS = TSCAPK (f , t, d) (8)
where TSCAPK () is a timestamp function by using CA’s
private key CAPK. After creating the timestamp TS, it is
Figure 1 Secret shares generation.
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sent back to the owner and kept as an archive by CA as
well. Subsequently, f, TS, SA, and C are used by CA in
verification purpose when the dispute arises. Note that
timestamping mechanism is completed by CA so that
detail discussion of digital signature is beyond the scope
of this paper.
2.2.2 Watermark verification and extraction procedure
The presence of original audio is not required in verifica-
tion and extraction phase. In order to verify the copyright
of an audio, anyone can use CA’s public key to validate the
timestampTS and owner’s public key to validate the signa-
ture f. When a dispute arises or multiple claims occur, the
earlier registered data will be regarded as the original one.
In the meantime, SA and C are used to verify copyright
watermark’s logo corresponding to the received audio.
As depicted in Figure 2, the extraction procedure is sim-
ilar to share image generation procedure and is illustrated
as follows:
Input: a received audio {A′ = a(s)|s = 1, . . . , Lsample},
a secret share image S(N× N), and a codebook C.
Output: an extracted watermark logo EW (N× N)
Step 1. A′ is segmented into F frames, denoted as Fr =
{ fri|i = 1, . . . , F}, and each frame contains N samples.
Next, T-level wavelet decomposition is performed on
each frame fri to yield its coarse signal AT and detail sig-
nal DT , DT−1, . . . ,D1. Then, DCT is on AT and obtained
DCT coefficients are denoted as ATCk = DCT(ATk ) =
{aHCk (n)|n = 1, · · · ,N/2T }.
Step 2. Construct a new sequence BTCn = {bTCn (n)|n =
1, . . . ,N/2T } by taking the first n frames of ATCk .
Step 3. Let x be 1.
Figure 2Watermark extraction procedure performed by CA.
a.Obtain the feature type t from BTCn based on
Equation (1).
b. Construct a public share block SBx by utilizing a
codebook C as described in (3) and (4) and feature
type t.
c. Add x to one. If x ≤ N × N then go to a.
Step 4. A public share image SBN × mN is yielded. An
extracted watermarkW ′(N × mN) is obtained by
W ′ = SAORSB. (9)
Step 5. Afterward, watermark reduction process is per-
formed according to Equation 5 to obtain the recovered
watermark EW (N × N).
3 Experimental results
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed scheme
in terms of ownership protection requirements, some
experiments are conducted. Bit error rate is emplo-
yed to measure robustness of the zero-watermarking
system,
BER = BMN 100% (10)
where B is the number of erroneously extracted bits.
Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is the ratio of quality sound to
noise. The higher the decibel (dB) value, the better is the
quality of the sound. For instance, a signal-to-noise ratio





i=0 (g(n) − f (n))2
)
(11)
is applied to evaluate the quality comparison between the
attacked audio and original audio. Where f(n) is an orig-
inal audio sample, and g(n) is an attacked audio sample.
SNR value is getting larger, thus leading to better audio
quality.
Pearson’s correlation, denoted as ρ(x,y),
ρ(x, y) = K
∑K















is employed to represent correlation between two images
where ρ(x,y) is a correlation coefficient (CC) between x
and y,X is an image 1,Y is an image 2, andK is the number
of image bits.
All the audio signals used in this test are audio with 16
bits/sample, 44.1 KHz sample rate, and 15 s long. We take
various audio data files with the most commonly related
to copyright protection issue. Therefore, three types of
audio, including classical (violin and bass), jazz (singer and
band), and instrumental (solo piano, solo guitar), are used
in the experiments. The watermark to be embedded is a
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Figure 3Watermark extraction result without being attacked. (a) Original audio signal, (b) original watermark, (c) secret share, (d) public share,
(e) extracted watermark, and (f) reduced watermark.
visually recognizable binary image of size 64 × 64. Three-
level wavelet decomposition is performed, and the frame
length is 512 samples.
3.1 Watermark extraction
We first investigate our proposed scheme in recover-
ing the watermark without being attacked. According to
the experimental results described in Figure 3, BER and
correlation coefficient values of all types of audio files are
respectively 0% and 1. It demonstrates that each bit of
watermark data is completely extracted and identical to
the original one.
On the other hand, an erroneous condition is dis-
covered in embedding phase of Chen and Zhu’s
scheme [4]. Consider the binary image watermark
W = {wi,j|wi,j{0, 1}, i = 0, . . . ,M − 1; j = 0, . . . ,N − 1}.
Table 1 BER and correlation coefficient of extractedwatermark attackedby StirMark
Attacks
Instrumental Jazz Classical CC in
BER CC BER CC BER CC [4]
a. AddBrumm 1.90% 0.92 0.85% 0.96 2.24% 0.91 0.98
b. AddDynNoise 5.57% 0.80 2.25% 0.91 3.17% 0.87 -
c. AddNoise 5.25% 0.81 1.81% 0.92 3.66% 0.86 0.99
d. AddSinus 0.098% 0.99 0.44% 0.98 1.17% 0.95 0.92
e. Amplify 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 1
f. BassBoost 2.39% 0.90 7.67% 0.75 2.05% 0.91 -
g. BitChanger 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 -
h. Compressor 0% 1 0.68% 0.97 0% 1 0.99
i. Echo 26.44% 0.47 18.70% 0.55 23.34% 0.50 1
j. ExtraStereo 5.91% 0.80 1.54% 0.93 4.27% 0.84 -
k. FlippSample (2000) 33.86% 0.4 17.11% 0.57 27.61% 0.45 -
FlippSample (100) 10.84% 0.68 3.34% 0.87 8.54% 0.72 -
l. LSBZero 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 -
m. NoiseMax 4.79% 0.82 1.61% 0.93 3.91% 0.85 -
n. RCHighPass 3.49% 0.86 8.94% 0.72 3.10% 0.87 -
o. RCLowPass 1.22% 0.95 0.51% 0.98 1.001% 0.96 1
p. ReplaceSamples 13.14% 0.64 5.03% 0.81 15.73% 0.59 -
q.Smooth 4.37% 0.83 0.81% 0.96 2.37% 0.90 0.99
r. Smooth2 3.10% 0.87 0.71% 0.97 2.51% 0.90 -
s. Stat1 4.76% 0.82 2.29% 0.90 4.42% 0.83 0.94
t. Stat2 1.68% 0.93 0.29% 0.99 1.05% 0.95 1
u. ZeroCross 3.78% 0.85 1.34% 0.94 3.83% 0.86 0.97
v. Resampling 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 1
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Figure 4 Examples of extracted watermark from attacked audio by StirMark. The music type of Instrumental is taken as an example. (a to v)
The extracted watermark from StirMark attacks.
To generate watermark key, they first constructed binary
pattern matrix B = {bt,p|bt,p{0, 1}, t = 0, . . . ,T − 1; p =
0, . . . , P − 1} where T is the number of selected frame
and P is the number of selected coefficient cumulants
on all selected frame. Then, the watermark key K3 was
Table 2 Performance over various durations
Attacks
00:01:38 00:02:20 00:04:08
BER CC BER CC BER CC
a. AddBrumm 2.44% 0.90 0.90% 0.96 3.88% 0.85
b. AddDynNoise 3.15% 0.87 3.22% 0.87 4.49% 0.83
c. AddNoise 6.61% 0.77 2.73% 0.89 7.91% 0.74
d. AddSinus 0.46% 0.98 0.31% 0.99 1.83% 0.92
e. Amplify 0% 1 0% 1 0.02% 0.99
f. BassBoost 5.81% 0.79 10.08% 0.69 13.75% 0.63
g. BitChanger 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1
h. Compressor 0% 1 0.6836% 0.9687 0% 1
i. Echo 18.43% 0.56 21.48% 0.52 24.80% 0.48
j. ExtraStereo 15.67% 0.60 17.26% 0.57 10.52% 0.68
k. FlippSample (2000) 21.34% 0.52 11.35% 0.67 30.44% 0.43
FlippSample (100) 5.98% 0.79 3.10% 0.87 8.30% 0.73
l. LSBZero 0% 1 0.02% 0.99 0.02% 0.99
m. NoiseMax 6.60% 0.77 1.78% 0.92 6.23% 0.78
n. RCHighPass 9.59% 0.70 17.79% 0.57 19.09% 0.55
o. RCLowPass 0.42% 0.98 0.27% 0.99 0.66% 0.97
p. ReplaceSamples 16.77% 0.58 6.13% 0.78 0% 1
q.Smooth 0.49% 0.98 0.32% 0.99 0.68% 0.97
r. Smooth2 0.85% 0.96 0.44% 0.98 1.05% 0.95
s. Stat1 1.83% 0.92 1.10% 0.95 2.10% 0.91
t. Stat2 0.37% 0.98 0.12% 0.99 0.29% 0.99
u. ZeroCross 8.74% 0.72 1.78% 0.92 8.50% 0.73
generated by performing XOR operation between binary
pattern matrix B and image watermark W. Notice
that matrix dimension of K3 will be equal to B. It is
reflected by the provided formula in [4] on how to
find each pixel position in W that corresponds to B.
In the extraction phase, the extracted watermark W ′ is
revealed by conducting XOR operation between K3 and
B. The dimension between W ′ and W is different, thus
causing the extracted watermark to be unrecognizable
and unusable for verification purpose. To improve the
problem, we simply utilize the entire of the obtained
DWT-DCT coefficients rather than employ certai
coefficients.
3.2 Robustness against incidental distortions
Incidental distortion refers to the distortions introduced
from real applications which do not change the content
of the multimedia data [17]. To evaluate the robustness
to such distortions, the scheme is tested by perform-
ing various attacks of audio signal processing provided
by StirMark for Audio (SMFA) version 1.03 [18] as well
as exploiting their default values. The aim of SMFA is
to delete, remove, or destroy the digital watermark by
modifying the signal of the audio file. According to the
Table 1, the minimum acceptable value of BER and CC
are located on FlippSample attack, which are approxi-
mately 26.19% and 0.47, respectively, and the extracted
watermark is still visually recognizable. This attack flips
2,000 samples every 10,000 with sample 6,000 ahead.
However, when the attack only flips 100 samples, the
average of BER and CC have both improved to approx-
imately 7.57% and 0.76, respectively. Thus, it leads to
assertion that in general the proposed scheme has a sat-
isfactory performance against StirMark attacks, especially
BitChanger, Compressor, and LSBZero as depicted in
Figure 4.
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The next attack conducted is downsampling gener-
ated by Cool Edit Pro 2.1. The sample of audio rate
is adjusted from 44,100 to 22,050 Hz, and then, its
sample rate is readjusted to 44,100 Hz. This process
might cause an alteration in some parts of audio data.
Consequently, the watermark data cannot be completely
extracted. However, the BER and correlation coefficient
value as shown in Table 1, which are 0% and 1, respec-
tively, indicate that the proposed scheme resists to such
attack.
To evaluate the robustness of proposed scheme, we draw
a comparison to earlier method [4] subjected to StirMark
attacks as well as short duration. In more detail, all the
audio signals used in [4] were audio with 16 bits/sample,
44.1 KHz sample rate, and 28.73 s long. The music styles
used throughout their experiment were not explicitly
reported. In order to properly compare the schemes, we
deliberately exploit various music styles. We expect the
music styles used in [4] to be any of ours. BER and cor-
relation coefficient values are reported in Table 1, and
the extracted watermark against those attacks is illus-
trated in Figure 4. The results indicate that our proposed
scheme outperforms Chen’s scheme [4] on AddSinus
and Compressor attacks. In case of other attacks, we
still achieve considerable results compared to Chen’s
scheme.
Furthermore, to verify the efficacy of the proposed
scheme, evaluation over various durations is conducted as
well. The duration is ranging from 1 to 4 min. However,
we did not perform comparative experiments because the
duration either in [4] or [5] is approximately below 60 s.
The experimental results against SMFA are reported in
Table 2. In general, the findings show that longer duration
provides fairly the same performance as short duration.
For example, BitChanger attack indicates exactly the same
results, while amplify and LSBZero attacks demonstrate
that the number of error bit is only one. To confirm the
findings, the resulting extracted watermarks are provided
in Figure 5.
3.3 Robustness against intentional distortions
Intentional distortion refers to distortions conducted by
deliberately modifying the host content [17]. It can be
performed by overwriting or removing the watermark. In
the following subsection, we address two types of intentional
distortions: counterfeit attack andmultiple claims situation.
3.3.1 Counterfeit attack
In some cases, the adversary tries to confuse ownership
by creating a faked original or faked watermarked audio.
In this case, an adversary performs a distortion by modi-
fication of a set of features of received audio A′ so-called
faked original audio Af . By doing so, it is expected that
the original watermark will be destroyed. One simple way
to alter the features is to modify the sample data in such
a way that the SNR is still acceptable. Figure 6 demon-
strates spectrogram of original audio signal and its faked
version due to sample data alteration. The vertical axis
represents frequencies up to 20,000 Hz, the horizontal
axis shows positive time toward the right, and the colors
represent the most important acoustic peaks for a given
time frame, with red representing the highest energies,
then in decreasing order of importance, orange, yellow,
green, cyan, blue, and magenta.
Once the faked signal is constructed, the adversary
may embed his watermark onto it and produce another
watermarked audio. In the verification phase, the adver-
sary’s audio signal is verified by using registered secret
share image. As shown in Table 3, the number of error
bits is approximately in ranges 49 to 118 bits from 4,096
bits, and the owner’s watermark is completely extracted.
It indicates that the proposed scheme performs well in
a b c d e f g h
i j k l m n o
q r s t u v
p
Figure 5 Examples of extracted watermark over various durations.We take audio with duration 00:02:20 as a sample. (a to v) The extracted
watermark from StirMark attacks reported in Table 2.
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Figure 6 Spectrogram of Jazz and its faked signals due to intentional distortion. (Top) Original audio signal. (Middle) Faked original signal with
SNR = 20.9949 dB. (Bottom) Faked original signal with SNR = 27.0155 dB. The figure is intended for color reproduction on the Web and in print.
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Table 3 Watermark extraction performance against
intentional distortion
Adversary’s Extracted SNR BER CC
watermark watermark
26.2626 dB 1.1963% 0.9467
20.242 dB 2.8809% 0.8824
watermark verification phase and possesses an unambiguous
property.
3.3.2 Multiple claims
In this situation, the adversary attempts to provoke a dis-
pute by embedding his/her own message. The following is
the model of the proposed scheme. In such a scheme, let
x = (x(1) . . . x(Nf ))T be a feature vector extracted from
the audio content with length-Nf . The message to be hid-
den is a binary matrix W of size N × N . The scheme
exploits (2,2)-secret sharing. The codebook C comprises
two 2 × n boolean matrices (C0i , C1i ) with:
- i = (1 . . . f ), f is the number of feature type.
- C0i and C1i are the base matrices for black and white
pixel, respectively.
The scheme is defined as the four-tuple (W , E ,D,C),
where:
- E : x×W × C → S is the encoder mapping a
sequence x, a hidden messageW using codebook C
to a secret share image S .
- D: x×C → P is the decoder mapping a sequence x
using codebook C to a public share image P .
According to our scheme, S is kept by CA while P
as well as codebook are publicly known. Suppose the
adversary intends to rewrite the content with his hidden
message. We would like to show that all his efforts are
fairly unworthy.
Suppose x*, C*, andW* are the feature vector extracted
from the retrieved audio content, adversary’s codebook,
and adversary’s hidden message, respectively. Based on
aforementioned statement, we might convey that C* ≡ C
such that
- E : x*×W∗ × C∗ → {S∗,P∗} where S* is the
adversary’s secret share. Note that S* is not required
since the original S have been registered by the
owner in advance.
Figure 7 The example of extracted watermark of multiple claims
condition.
- D: x*×C∗ → P* where P* is the adversary’s public
share. Due to the property of our scheme, it is obvious
that x* ≡ x which implies that P∗ ≡ P . Thus the
adversary’s hidden message will never be extracted. 
To evoke multiple claims situation, the adversary
embeds his watermark, which is depicted in Table 3, onto
the x*. Figure 7 shows that original’s watermark remains
extracted.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the problem of constructing an
audio ownership protection scheme in order to resist
against both intentional and incidental distortions. To
achieve these goals, we have integrated wavelet trans-
form, visual cryptography, and digital timestamp into an
ownership protection scheme. The trade-off between data
payload and two other properties, imperceptibility and/or
robustness, can be reduced, while preserving its audio
signal quality. According to experimental results, the pro-
posed scheme fulfills several properties of ownership
protection including perceptual transparency, blindness,
robustness, security, and unambiguousness. In terms of
security, it is achieved by means of visual cryptography
method. Without possessing both shares, it is infeasible
for anyone to retrieve the secret image from each share.
The integrity of codebook and its secret share image is
guaranteed by certification authority through timestamp
mechanism. It indicates that audio ownership protec-
tion can take advantage from the combination of visual
cryptography and watermarking and proposed scheme
can be widely applied to the area of audio ownership
protection.
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